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CONFLICT OF LAWS-ONE INCH FORWARD,
A HALF INCH BACKWARD
Michael J. Polelle*
During the past year, Illinois courts have resolved questions of conflict
of laws with increasing frequency. In this Article, Professor Polelle criti-
cally analyzes these Illinois conflicts decisions, with particular emphasis
on developments affecting the law of torts, contracts, and sister state judg-
ments, and examines difficulties and ambiguities arising from the courts' de-
cisions. He concludes that the difficulties are largely the result of important
doctrinal changes effected within the conflicts area by recent decisions, and
predicts their ultimate resolution in future decis'ons, as Illinois courts con-
tinue to incorporate more modern principles into decisions within the con-
flicts area.
N the last survey of Illinois conflict of laws, Professor Con-
viser characterized the development in this area of law as inching
forward slowly.' This past year the Illinois courts have
encountered conflicts problems with even greater frequency.
The evaluation of doctrinal changes wrought by this encounter is one
that might better be characterized as a process of one inch forward
and a half inch backward. The modern rule of validation has made
its tentative appearance in Illinois law alongside the traditional Illi-
nois conflicts rule for contract cases. However, application of the
"most significant relationship" principle in the torts area has been at
least temporarily stifled by ambiguity in the 1970 Illinois Supreme
Court opinion, Ingersoll v. Klein,2 which introduced the principle
into Illinois jurisprudence. Any doctrine relating to the enforcea-
bility of sister state judgments in Illinois should be updated before
it causes future problems. But all in all, in any case, the law slowly
works itself free of largely nineteenth-century doctrine.
* Associate Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law.
1. Conviser, Conflict of Laws, 1972-1973, Survey of Illinois Law, 23 DEPAUL
L. REV. 89 (1973).




The preference of Illinois courts for a result-oriented methodology
is best seen in the sequel to Ingersoll, a 1970 landmark decision that
abandoned the traditional Illinois approach in torts cases. The tra-
ditional approach, or lex loci delicti, required that the law of the
place where the tort was committed be used to resolve conflicts
cases in the tort field. Instead, the Illinois Supreme Court in In-
gersoll adopted the Restatement (Second) approach, which requires
that in tort cases the law of the jurisdiction with the most significant
relationship to the occurrence be used.4 Little noticed at the time
was the last paragraph of the Ingersoll opinion and the pregnant
admonition it contained.
We are aware that the views expressed herein may create hardship in other
cases filed in reliance upon the doctrine of lex loci delicti. In such cases
where hardship would result, the rules expressed herein shall not ap-
ply. See: Molitor v. Kaneland Corn. Unit Dist., 18 111. 2d 11, 27 and
cases cited therein. 5
This cryptic paragraph has been eagerly seized upon by the Illi-
nois apppellate court in the last year as a way of providing re-
lief for Illinois residents who are plaintiffs in multistate personal in-
jury cases.
In Cardin v. Cardin,6 a daughter drove her mother in the daugh-
ter's automobile on a short trip to Wisconsin in May, 1967. On the
way back to Illinois, where both parties were residents, the daugh-
ter-driver crashed into another vehicle on the Wisconsin side of the
border. Subsequently the mother sued the daughter in Illinois for
personal injuries caused by the alleged negligent driving of the
daughter. At trial the lower court granted a directed verdict
against the complaint on the ground that the applicable Illinois guest
statute required the plaintiff to allege and prove that the host-driver
committed wilful and wanton conduct. The jury returned a verdict
for the defendant-daughter. The appellate court reversed this jury
3. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-383 (1934); 2 J. BEALE, THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378.2, at 1289 (1935). For a discussion of the development
of the lex loci delecti doctrine, see CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 5-9 (1965).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
5. 46 111. 2d at 49, 262 N.E.2d at 597.
6. 14 I11. App. 3d 82, 302 N.E.2d 238 (1st Dist. 1973).
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verdict on the ground that Wisconsin law, rather than Illinois law,
should have been applied. The Wisconsin law required only proof
of negligence, since Wisconsin had no guest statute and, unlike Il-
linois, employed the doctrine of comparative negligence rather than
contributory negligence. The same factual pattern involving the
same states occurred a few months later in Amundson v. Astrin.7
The trial court, using the most significant relationship test, applied
Illinois law. Again the appellate court reversed and sent the case
back for a new trial under the laws of Wisconsin.
Both courts cited the last paragraph of the Ingersoll opinion as a
justification for application of the law of the place where the tort
was committed, that is, the law of Wisconsin. The Cardin court in-
deed admitted that, but for this last paragraph of the Ingersoll
opinion, an appellate court would normally be obligated to follow
the law in force at the time a case comes up on appeal." Since
the Illinois Supreme Court opinion in Ingersoll was filed on March
24, 1970, an appellate court in 1973 would of course be obligated
to follow the decision of a higher court if that opinion were not
limited to prospective application. However, the Cardin court ac-
cepted the argument of the plaintiff that applying the Ingersoll Re-
statement (Second) approach would cause her a "hardship;" she had
acted in reliance upon existing law, the "place-of-tort" rule, when
she filed her complaint in December, 1967.1 The plaintiff also ar-
gued that it was not her fault that the trial docket was so crowded
that she could not get a trial before Ingersoll was decided. In find-
ing the plaintiff's logic impeccable, the Cardin court strangely ig-
nored the fact that the appellate and supreme court decisions in the
Ingersoll case came down well before the plaintiff ever went to trial
in the case. Moreover, the Amundson court agreed that, under the
last paragraph of the Illinois Supreme Court opinion in the Ingersoll
case, it would be a hardship on the plaintiff to meet the higher Illi-
nois burden of proving wilful and wanton conduct because the
change of law in the Ingersoll decision was inherently a hard-
7. 15 II1. App. 3d 997, 305 N.E.2d 685 (1st Dist. 1973).
8. People ex rel. Baver-v. Water Commission, 20 Ill. 2d 139, 144, 169 N.E.2d
350, 353 (1960); People ex rel. Eitel v. Lindheimer, 371 I11. 367, 374, 21 N.E.2d
318, 321 (1939).
9. 14 Il1. App. 3d at 85, 302 N.E.2d at 240.
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ship. Yet, in the Amundson case, the accident occurred in Wiscon-
sin during February, 1966, and the complaint was filed in May,
1967. Therefore, when the Amundson case went to trial in Jan-
uary, 1970, the appellate court decision in the Ingersoll case, which
applied the Restatement (Second) approach, was known to the
plaintiff in the Amundson case before that Plaintiff ever went to
trial. Clearly, in neither the Cardin case nor the Amundson case
was the plaintiff surprised by the Restatement (Second) approach.
Rather, the change of the law in itself, although it occurred before
the plaintiff ever went to trial, was supposed to have worked a hard-
ship.
On the same day that Amundson was decided by the fourth divi-
sion of the First District, the fifth division decided Naramore v.
Colquitt.'0 In Naramore both plaintiff and defendant, who were
Illinois residents, became involved in an automobile accident in
Kentucky on September 3, 1966. At the time, the plaintiff was a
guest passenger in an automobile driven by the host-defendant. In
March, 1967, the plaintiff filed suit in Illinois. Kentucky, like
Wisconsin, had no guest statute and therefore only required that a
guest passenger prove negligence against the host-driver. Illinois law
required the application of a guest statute with the higher standard
of wilful and wanton conduct. This appellate court reversed a ver-
dict rendered for the defendant under Illinois law and remanded the
case for a new trial according to the lower standard of simple negli-
gence under Kentucky law. The Naramore court acknowledged
that in Ingersoll not only the appellate decision, but even the su-
preme court opinion, had been published between the filing of the
original complaint in the Naramore case on March 1, 1967, and the
subsequent amended complaint filed in August, 1971. It is thus ab-
solutely clear that before the plaintiff in the Naramore case ever went
to trial, the law in Illinois had been changed from lex loci delicti to
the Restatement (Second) approach of "most significant relation-
ship." Faithful to the strict language of the supreme court Ingersoll
opinion, the fifth division in Naramore refused to accept the plaintiffs
argument that the Ingersoll decision was really only meant to be
applied prospectively. Despite the reference to Molitor v. Kaneland
10. 15 Il1. App. 3d 954, 305 N.E.2d 662 (1st Dist. 1973).
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Community Unit Dist. No. 30211 in the Ingersoll opinion, the fifth
division stated that had the Illinois Supreme Court meant the Inger-
soll decision to be applied only prospectively, the Illinois Supreme
Court was obligated to do so expressly under ordinary canons of judi-
cial craftsmanship. Rather, the court in Naramore felt bound by the
rule that a case is to be decided on the law as it stands when judgment
is rendered and not when the suit is brought. Clearly, this rule was
adverse to the plaintiff in the Naramore case, since it would lead to the
conclusion that Illinois law, as the law of the most significant relation-
ship, should be applied. Unable to accept this result, the fifth divi-
sion seized upon the last paragraph of the Illinois Supreme Court
decision in Ingersoll as a way of finding for the plaintiff while still
not holding the Ingersoll decision to be entirely prospective. Yet
the fifth division obscurely conceded that the Ingersoll opinion had
some kind of undefined, limited retroactivity that did not apply to
the facts of the Naramore case because of hardship.
The fifth division concluded in Naramore that Ingersoll was to be
applied retrospectively as well as prospectively, except in those
cases where hardship would result from filing a complaint in reli-
ance upon the lex loci delicti rule. The appellate court then found
that the plaintiff had suffered hardship because the plaintiff had
"placed justifiable reliance on the law of Illinois as it then existed"
when the original complaint was filed, and that such reliance "need
not be affirmatively proved but can be implied from the attendant
circumstances of the case."' 2  Apparently, the alleged inferred
hardship resulted from the fact that since the plaintiff had presumed
at the time of filing the original complaint that Illinois would apply
the lex loci delicti rule, the plaintiff was deterred from filing suit in
Kentucky, which would then have applied its own law of simple negli-
gence. The court also noted that suits for negligence must be com-
menced within one year from the date of injury under Kentucky law.
The gist of the determination of hardship is contained in the follow-
ing words:
Consequently, the application of the Illinois law and the requisite increase
in the degree of proof necessary to establish liability, coupled with the in-
11. 18 II. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959). In Molitor, the Illinois Supreme Court
abolished the doctrine of school district tort immunity. However, the decision was
given only prospective operation. See text accompanying note 16 infra.
12. 15 Il1. App. 3d at 959, 305 N.E.2d at 666.
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ability of plaintiff to adjudicate his claim in a favorable forum, effectively
prevented plaintiff from recovering for his injuries. These factors consti-
tute a hardship attributable to the placing of reliance on the doctrine of
lex loci delicti and should exempt plaintiff from the Ingersoll holding (cita-
tions omitted).' 3
The Cardin-Amundson-Naramore line of cases is based on an
indefensible rationale that equates supposed reliance by plaintiff
with hardship to plaintiff. The whole support of a flexible "most sig-
nificant relationship" approach in modem conflicts cases involving
torts is precisely that reliance is an almost meaningless concept in
tort law.' 4  Plaintiffs do not plan to become involved in vehicular
accidents while taking multistate vacations and still less do they con-
jecture what law would apply in a multistate automobile accident
in the event -that a hypothetical automobile accident should -take
place. Once the accident happens, it would be extraordinary to sug-
gest that a plaintiff has a vested right in freezing the growth of the
law as soon as the complaint is filed. It is certainly not unusual
for the law to change in Illinois before a complaint is filed, after a
complaint is filed, during a trial and after a trial while a case is on
appeal. Yet, it has always been supposed in these instances, as
the Cardin and Naramore cases hasten to concede, -that the new
law is to be applied retroactively as well as prospectively, save for
the unusual case where the Illinois Supreme Court expressly applies
its decision prospectively. If reliance is to be taken seriously in this
context, one should inquire why plaintiffs do not also rely on the ex-
pectation that law can be changed after a case is filed and even
after the case is on appeal.
Surely the Amundson court has put the issue too broadly by its
statement: "We find that hardship to plaintiffs' cause was inher-
ent as a result of the change in the law."'" New case law is com-
monly applied by appellate courts, even during oral argument (and
even though such case law did not exist during the trial), so how
can a trial-level plaintiff, still in the pleading stage, experience any
greater hardship or reliance? Such an overboard view would stifle
13. Id.
14. "In the torts area, it is a rare case where the parties give advance thought
to the law that may be applied to determine the legal consequences of their action."
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) § 188, Comment b.
15. 15 II. App. 3d at 1000, 305 N.E.2d at 686.
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the growth of any law if taken to heart. Moreover, even the nar-
rower suggestion of Naramore that deprivation of suit in a more fa-
vorable forum constitutes the hardship to plaintiff is analytically
suspect. Surely no plaintiff has the right to delay legal development
across the country after he or she selects a jurisdiction in which to
file a complaint on the ground that any change of law after the
complaint was filed might deprive the plaintiff of a more favorable
jurisdiction in which to sue. In any event, there is no indication in
Naramore that the defendant, an Illinois resident who returned
to Illinois right after the accident, was amenable in any way to
service in Kentucky under the more-favorable forum approach even
had the plaintiff wished to sue in Kentucky.
If the reliance interest were to be taken at face value, then it
would be paradoxical that the courts in Cardin, Amundson and
Naramore did not evaluate the reliance or expectation interests of
the defendants in having the "most significant relationship" holding
of the Ingersoll case applied. The paradox is especially curious
because the Molitor case, cited in the last paragraph of the supreme
court Ingersoll opinion, was concerned precisely with governmental
units which as defendants-not plaintiffs-had come to rely on the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. As a result, the Illinois Supreme
Court in the Molitor case used an express prospective ruling so
that governmental units would have time to become adequately in-
sured. Moreover, if introduction of strict tort liability was not con-
sidered a sufficient hardship on Illinois defendants so as to make
the Suvada v. White Motor Co.16 ruling prospective or at least to
create possible exceptions for hardship cases, then one must won-
der why reliance interests of plaintiffs in tort cases are greater than
those of defendants.
The Illinois appellate court has in effect made the Ingersoll de-
cision practically prospective by giving the broadest possible
meaning to hardship. Despite the protestations of the appellate
court that it is not reading Ingersoll as a prospective opinion, it is
virtually impossible to imagine a plaintiff who would be unsuccess-
ful in invoking the lex loci delicti rule on the broad grounds of
hardship that have been- carved out by the appellate courts. The
16. 32 111. 2d 612, 210 N.E.,2d 182 (1965),
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plaintiff under this interpretation has the best of all possible worlds.
If the "most significant relationship" rule is more favorable, the
plaintiff will of course invoke the Ingersoll holding; if -the doctrine
is unfavorable, the plaintiff can avoid the Ingersoll holding simply
by claiming the hardship that automatically arises from any change
of law and then reverting to the lex loci delicti rule. The single
rule of conflicts law that emerges from the Cardin-Amundson-Nar-
amore cases with hornbook clarity is the following: the plaintiff
who was injured before Ingersoll was decided will probably prevail
one way or another. However, one wonders what would have hap-
pened if Wisconsin or Kentucky law had provided for a guest stat-
ute and Illinois law had not. If the defendant under this re-
versed hypothetical had claimed hardship, would the appellate
courts have applied the lex loci delicti rule in favor of the defend-
ant? If not, then it may be that some members of ,the Illinois
judiciary are implicitly moving toward a "better law" approach so
as to leave the court free to apply the law which appears to be
the best from any jurisdiction that has substantial contact with the
occurrence.17 It may be that a part of the Illinois judiciary is so
disenchanted with the Illinois tort doctrines of contributory negli-
gence, guest statute liability and interfamily immunity that it is
eager to apply the tort doctrines of other jurisdictions in multistate
situations. It may use the cloak of a conflicts analysis so as to al-
low the plaintiff to recover for severe injuries. The implicit as-
sumption of at least a part of the Illinois judiciary may be that the
better law is the law which allows the plaintiff to recover in tort
cases. If so, then this assumption should be set forth candidly by
the courts so that bench and bar may consider it and modify the
internal law of Illinois accordingly. The indirect venting of such
substantive tort preferences in the occasional happenstance of a
multistate tort case, however, hampers the development of neutral
conflicts principles.
In fairness to the Illinois appellate court, it should be observed
17. A leading proponent of the "better rule of law" approach is Professor Robert
A. Leflar.. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw 243-45 (1968). The "better
law" approach is also approved in Juenger, Choice of Law in Interstate Torts, 118
U. PA. L. REv. 202, 235 (1969). A Minnesota court recently relied on the "better
rule of law" approach to apply the lex loci delicti which did not have a guest statute.
Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
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that if the Illinois Supreme Court in the Ingersoll case meant -that
decision to operate only prospectively, then the Illinois Supreme
Court should expressly so hold and should provide a reasoned justi-
fication of that extraordinary step. This obligation is especially
imperative because the Illinois appellate court has termed the man-
date of the Ingersoll hardship paragraph "unclear," 18 and is pro-
ceeding on the doctrinal assumption that Ingersoll was not intended
to be entirely prospective. If, on the other hand, the Illinois Su-
preme Court did not intend the Ingersoll decision to be applied only
prospectively, then it should have supplied a reasoned definition
of the hardship concept. The present broad meaning interpreted by
the Illinois appellate court has practically turned the Ingersoll de-
cision into an entirely prospective one, since a mere change in law
or deprivation of a more favorable forum is automatically consid-
ered a hardship.
CONTRACT LAW
In Cook Associates, Inc. v. Colonial Broach & Machine Co.,29
the defendant was a Delaware manufacturing corporation which had
its place of business in Michigan. The defendant hired an em-
ployee referred to it by the plaintiff, an Illinois employment agency.
The defendant corporation had neither offices nor employees in Il-
linois nor was it listed as a foreign corporation doing business in Il-
linois. The employee, a Wisconsin resident, responded to the plain-
tiffs advertisement in a business journal by traveling to Chicago
to register with the employment agency. A coded anonymous res-
ume was prepared by the Illinois employment agency and mailed in
the form of a "flyer" to prospective employers all across the United
States. The vice-president of the defendant corporation thereupon
telephoned the plaintiff employment agency from Michigan. Over
the telephone the plaintiff agreed to forward particulars about the
prospective employee in exchange for a promise by the vice-presi-
dent to pay the referral fee upon hiring the prospective employee.
Subsequently the defendant corporation hired the prospective em-
18. 15 I1. App. 3d at 957, 305 N.E.2d at 665. See, 14 Il1. App. 3d at 84, 302
N.E.2d at 240.
19. 14 Ill App. 3d 965, 304 N,.2d 27 (lst Dist. 1973).
[Vol. 24:320
CONFLICT OF LAWS
ployee. When the plaintiff company discovered this it sued in Illinois
to recover its referral fee from the defendant corporation. The appel-
late court found that the one telephone call made from Michigan
to Chicago was sufficient to establish jurisdiction in Illinois under
the minimum contacts theory of International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton.20
Having found jurisdiction, the appellate court in Cook Associates
held that Illinois contract law rather than Michigan contract law
should be applied under the applicable Illinois conflict of laws prin-
ciple. The appellate court summarized the traditional Illinois con-
flicts rule in contracts cases:
Under Illinois law, if a contract is made in one state with the intention
that it be performed in another, and the states are governed by different
laws, the law of the place where the contract is to be performed will con-
trol as to the contract's validity and will prevail over the law where the con-
tract was entered into (citations omitted). 2 1
Under Michigan law the contract was alleged to be unenforceable
because the plaintiff company was not licensed to do business in Mich-
igan, as required by Michigan statutory law. In addition, 'the de-
fendant claimed that under Michigan statutory law the contract was
unenforceable because it was not in writing. The appellate court
found it unnecessary to determine the state of Michigan law because
it held that the Illinois law, which did not have these restrictions,
should apply. The court avoided the issue of where the con-
tract was made, but the facts indicate that the contract was made
in Michigan where the vice-president spoke the words of accept-
20. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Substantial treatments of the "minimum contact" re-
quirement of the International Shoe decision are: Cleary & Seder, Extended Jur-
isdictional Bases for the Illinois Courts, 50 Nw. U.L. REV. 599 (1955); Currie, The
Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963
U. ILL. L.F. 533.
21. 14 I11. App. 3d at 971. 304 N.E.2d at 31. For criticism of the "place of per-
formance" rule, see Morris, The Eclipse of the Lex Loci Solutionis-A Fallacy Ex-
ploded, 6 VAND. L. REV. 505 (1953).
Comprehensive discussion of the various choice-of-law rules which have evolved
regarding the validity and construction of contracts appear in the following articles:
Coyne, Contracts, Conflicts, and Choice-Influencing Considerations, 1969 U. ILL
L.F. 323 [hereinafter cited as Coyne]; Prebble, Choice of Law to Determine the
Validity and Effect of Contracts: A Comparison of English and American Ap-
proaches to the Conflict of Laws, (pts. 1-2), 58 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 635 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Prebble]; Weintraub, Choice of Law in Contract, 54 IowA L.
REV. 399 (1968).
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ance into the telephone receiver. The appellate court looked im-
mediately to the place of performance and admitted that the par-
ties did not specify in their telephone conversation where the con-
tract was to be performed.
Undaunted, the First District Appellate Court found that the con-
tract was really to be performed in Illinois because "the nature of the
contract was such that both parties knew plaintiffs services would be
performed from its office in Illinois."22 The court discounted the fact
that the interviewing and hiring of the employee took place in Mich-
igan, since the services which made the defendant liable had already
taken place in Illinois prior to the interviewing and hiring. As an "ad-
ditional ground," the appellate court adopted the largely academic
theory that when con-tracts are voluntarily made, the law of the
state which would validate the contract should be chosen for the so-
lution of the conflicts problem because it is to be presumed the
parties intended an enforceable contract rather -than an unenforce-
able one.23  Since the contract would probably be unenforceable
under Michigan law, the court chose to employ Illinois law under
the validation theory, thereby upholding the enforceability of the con-
tract.
The most interesting aspect of the Cook Associates case is the
additional ground of the decision, based on the rule of validation. 24
The Cook Associates court curiously skipped over the Restate-
ment (Second) theory of "most significant relationship" in its at-
tempt to bolster the traditional IMinois conflicts rule and instead
applied an even more novel rule of validation. There are two pos-
sible reasons why the "most significant relationship" test was avoided
as an additional ground by the First District. First, the contacts
were so evenly split between Michigan and Illinois that neither Illi-
nois nor Michigan was realistically the state of the most significant
relationship. The second reason may be that the Restatement (Sec-
ond) test relegates the justified expectations of the parties to a mi-
22. 14 I11. App. 3d at 971, 304 N.E.2d at 32.
.23. .d. at 971-72, 304 N.E.2d at 32.
24. The rule of validation has been applied frequently to contracts cases that in-
volve an issue concerning usury. Coyne, supra note 21, at 334. A leading proponent
of a broad rule of validation is Professor Albert A. Ehrenzweig. See A. EHRENZ-
WEIo, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 173, at 458 (1962). For an excellent
discussion of the lex validitatis theory see Prebble, supra note 21, pt. 2, at 657-63.
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nor rank behind more imposing contact points, such as the place
of contracting, the place of negotiation, the place of performance,
the location of the subject matter of the contract and the domicile of
the parties.25 It may be that for this appellate court the presumed
expectations of the parties are either the sole or at least the pre-
dominating factor in selecting the appropriate law for contract
cases. If this additional ground is a glimpse of things to come, then
Illinois will have leaped from a pre-Restatement (Second) method-
ology of -the "most significant relationship" to the "rule of valida-
tion," whose unreserved support has been still largely confined to
academe, with only tentative inroads into the decision-making proc-
ess of the courts. The irony is that Illinois eagerly seized upon the
Restatement (Second) approach for the solution of tort cases in
Ingersoll v. Klein2" but has yet to adopt an unadulterated Restate-
ment (Second) approach in the field of contracts where the Illi-
nois appellate court has obviously not been completely satisfied
with the traditional place-of-performance rule as the ultimate de-
terminant.
SISTER STATE JUDGMENTS
In Davis v. Nehf27 a New York real estate broker, licensed in
New York, sued there for a brokerage commission allegedly owed by
the defendant, Nehf, who owned an office building in Chicago.
The defendant had his sole place of business in Illinois and had not
been to New York for five years. The only contacts between the
plaintiff and the defendant were by telephone and mail concerning
the rental of space in defendant's Chicago office building. The
plaintiff, Davis, telephoned the defendant, Nehf, from New York to
advise Nehf of a prospective tenant whom Davis had found for
Nehf's building. Considerable correspondence ensued between Da-
vis and Nehf. In addition, telephone calls were placed by Davis
from New York to Chicago and by Nehf from Chicago to New
York concerning the prospective lease. It was agreed that Nehf
would pay Davis the prevailing brokerage fees in exchange for his
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 188.
26. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
27, 14 I11. App. 3d 318, 302 N.E,2d 382 (1st Dist. 1973).
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brokerage services. When the lessee defaulted on the rent, Davis
filed suit in New York for the brokerage fee and served the de-
fendant with summons in Chicago pursuant to the New York long-
arm statute. The defendant did not file an appearance in New
York and allowed a New York judgment to be entered against
him by default. Davis then filed a petition in the Circuit Court
of Cook County to register the New York judgment. The appel-
late court reversed the summary judgment in favor of Davis' peti-
tion to register the New York judgment on the ground that New
York lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment.
The appellate court rejected the argument of Davis that Illinois
was bound by the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution
to honor the default judgment of the New York court whose juris-
diction had not been directly challenged by defendant in New York.
The appellate court simply said in support of its position:
We must, of course, reject this argument. The courts of Illinois may in-
quire into the proceedings of a sister state to determine whether such court
had jurisdiction of the subject matter or the parties so as to bring the judg-
ment within the full faith and credit clause (citations omitted).28
The Davis case is a correct result arrived at by an apparently
over-inclusive rationale. A preliminary confusion is caused by some
doubt as to whether the opinion turns on the point that the New
York contacts are too minimal to comply even with the constitutional
minimums of International Shoe, or that even though the contacts
comport with minimal constitutional requirements, the New York
long-arm statute as a matter of statutory construction is not suffi-
cient to extend as far as the Constitution would permit. Upon analy-
Sis, however, the Davis opinion must necessarily be read to hold
that the New York contacts were sufficient to establish jurisdiction
in the New York courts under the International Shoe doctrine; this
very term two cases in Illinois have held that a single telephone call
made within Illinois by a nonresident defendant was enough to es-
tablish jurisdiction in Illinois. 29 These cases render it inconceivable
that Illinois could seriously claim New York had insufficient con-
28. Id. at 321, 302 N.E.2d at 385.
29. Colony Press Inc. v. Fleeman, 17 I11. App. 3d 14, 308 N.E.2d 78 (1st Dist.
1974); Cook Associates, Inc. v. Colonial Broach & Machine Co., 14 111. App. 3d
965, 304 N.E.2d 27 (1st Dist. 1973).
[Vol. 24:320
CONFLICT OF LAWS
tacts for constitutional purposes in the Davis case while Illinois
could claim such constitutional jurisdiction based on one telephone
call into the State of Illinois.
The real question in the Davis case, therefore, is to what extent
the courts of Illinois may construe the long-arm statute of a sister
state as insufficient to confer jurisdiction under the existing case
law of that state, even though the contacts of that state to the case
are obviously sufficient to meet International Shoe standards. In
effect, the Davis court, after having analyzed several New York
appellate cases, held that a New York trial court did not have
jurisdiction to enter a judgment because New York appellate cases
construing the New York long-arm statute did not interpret that
statute to reach so far, although the Constitution would have per-
mitted it. Obviously this presents the awkward procedural stance
of an Illinois appellate court presumably telling the trial courts of a
sister state how to interpret a statute of the sister state according to
the case law of the sister state. Yet it is basic law that an error of
law commited by a sister state when it renders a judgment is insuffi-
cient reason for another state to refuse to enforce that judgment."0
The inherent danger of the Davis case lies in the perhaps uninten-
tionally sweeping nature of its language that Illinois may always
question the jurisdictional basis of a judgment rendered in a sister
state. This overly broad statement of -the law has been aided and
abetted by decisions and hornbooks that have failed to absorb mod-
em developments in conflict of laws.81 Relying on Baldwin v.
Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn, 2 the United States Supreme Court
30. This is the common law rule, entirely apart from the full faith and credit
clause. Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1946); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230
(1908); Van Matre v. Sankey, 148 Ill. 536 (1893). Accord, RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) § 106.
31. Long after Baldwin and the other decisions relied on in Durfee should
have put an end to the notion that jurisdiction was something special, at
least one textbook continues to parrot the old saw that "The full faith and
credit clause of the Constitution and the legislation thereunder do not pre-
clude an inquiry into the question of jurisdiction of the first court to ren-
der the judgment," with only a footnoted cross-reference to the revolution
worked by the more recent decisions. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 395
(Scoles ed. 1964).
R. CRAMPTON & D. CURRIE, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS
603 (1968).
32. 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
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in Durfee v. Duke8 unequivocally held:
However, while it is established that a court in one State, when asked to
give effect to the judgment of a court in another State, may constitutition-
ally inquire into the foreign court's jurisdiction to render that judgment,
the modem decisions of this Court have carefully delineated the per-
missibile scope of such an inquiry. From these decisions there emerges
the general rule that a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit-even as
to questions of jurisdiction-when the second court's inquiry discloses
that those questions have been fully and fairly litigated and finally de-
cided in the court which rendered the original judgment.8 4
The apparent holding of Davis is simply too broad to be constitu-
tionally acceptable in light of the interlocking nature of modern so-
ciety in the United States. Even though the Davis case seemed to
have nothing turn on the fact that the case involved a default judg-
ment, that factor is a crucial one under the Durfee doctrine that jur-
isdictional matters once fairly and fully litigated are binding in an-
other state under normal res judicata principles so as to preclude
collateral attack. Even several earlier Illinois cases were aware
that in the divorce area the United States Supreme Court has re-
quired that foreign divorce decrees be honored by a sister state
where the issue of jurisdiction was fully litigated in the state
which rendered the judgment."' There is no reason why judgments
for money, such as in the Davis case, should be treated any differ-
ently than the jurisdictional requisites of domicile in divorce cases.
Thus the proper disposition of the Davis case under a modern
theory of judgments is to ask whether the default judgment ob-
tained in New York involved a full and fair hearing on the ques-
tion of New York jurisdiction. An analysis of New York law leads
to the conclusion that in cases of default judgments the clerk of
court simply enters the judgment if the claim is for a sum certain or
the sum can be made certain by mathematical computation.8" It
is apparent, therefore, that under the law of New York the issue of
jurisdiction was neither litigated nor decided by a judge. In addi-
33. 375 U.S. 106 (1963).
34. Id.at311.
35. "It is the rule that where the question of jurisdiction has been raised in the
proceedings in the sister State and there adjudicated, such decision becomes res adju-
dicata of the question (citations omitted)." Blakeslee v. Blakeslee, 213 Ill. App. 168,
170 (1st Dist. 1919). See also In re Estate of Day, 7 Il. 2d 348, 131 N.E.2d 50
(1955).
36. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 3215 (McKinney 1970).
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tion, the Restatement (Second) suggests that the local law of the
state where the judgment was rendered should determine whether a
party who loses the jurisdictional issue and has a judgment rendered
against himself should be able to collaterally attack the judgment
in another state for lack of jurisdiction.3 7  The law of New York,
where the judgment was rendered, does apply the principle of res ju-
dicata to default judgments.38  However, the local law of New
York is the same as the constitutional requirements of the Durfee
principle: collateral attack on a judgment for lack of jurisdiction
is only permissible where the issue of jurisdiction, or the jurisdic-
tional facts, were not previously litigated in the first forum. 9
Thus, whether one applies the constitutional implications of the
Durfee case under full faith and credit, or simply the local law of
New York, the Illinois appellate court could properly permit Nehff,
the defendant in the Davis case, to collaterally attack the New York
judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction under New York law be-
cause the issue of jurisdiction was never litigated at all in New
York. Had the issue been litigated, the Davis case should have
been decided differently.
What should be avoided by bench and bar is the facile dictum
that lack of jurisdiction can always be raised as a defense to a sister
state judgment even where the issue of jurisdiction has been fully
and fairly litigated in the sister state. If the sister state has erred
in interpreting its own jurisdictional law, that is clearly insufficient
reason to dishonor the sister state judgment. The proper recourse is
for the defendant to appeal the sister state trial court decision on the
jurisdictional point to the appellate courts of the sister state in order
to correct the error of law. Where the issue of jurisdiction over
subject matter and person has been fully and fairly litigated in a
sister state, it would do presumptuous violence to the principle of
federalism for the appellate courts of Illinois to hold that the
trial courts of another state have erred in interpreting their own
statutes and their own case law. Finally, the melding of twentieth-
century American society into a homogeneous unity irrespective of
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 97.
38. WEiNsTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YoRx CIVIL PRACICE § 5011.12 (rev.
1973).
39. Id. § 5011.43 n.278.
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state lines is a historical process that renders quaint the nineteenth-
century theory that judgments of sister states can always be attacked
for lack of jurisdiction whether or not the jurisdictional issue has
been already litigated in the sister state.
MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS: HEREIN OF FORUM
NON CONVENIENS AND INJUNCTIONS
In a precedent-setting case the Illinois Supreme Court has held
that a trial judge will be reversed where the judge abuses his discre-
tion in denying defendant's motion for forum non conveniens.40
In Adkins v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R.4' the plaintiff's
decedent was killed in Iowa when the defendant's train collided with
a truck driven by the deceased. The plaintiff, a resident of Michi-
gan, sued for the death in the federal district court of Iowa. The
railroad, a Delaware company, which did business in Iowa, Illinois
and twenty other states, was the sole defendant. The case was dis-
missed at the trial level on plaintiffs motion, and suit was brought
anew in Illinois, the Circuit Court of Rock Island County, with the
railroad again named as the sole defendant. The defendant then
filed its motion of forum non conveniens and before the Illinois
trial court ruled on the motion, the plaintiff bolstered opposition to
the motion by adding the chief engineer and the traffic engineer of the
railroad as individual defendants, both of whom were conveniently
Illinois residents. The trial court thereupon denied defendant's
motion of forum non conveniens. The case went to trial in Illi-
nois where a judgment of $449,757 was entered at the trial level
against the defendant but was later reduced by the appellate court
by means of a $199,757 remittitur.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the
ground that the motion for forum non conveniens should have been
40. The doctrine of lorum non conveniens permits the court, at its discretion, to
dismiss the action where there is no substantial or legitimate basis for plaintiff's
choice of forum. W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT
OF LAWS 218 (6th ed. 1971). For an excellent statement of the reasons underlying
the rule, see Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law,
29 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1929). For an interesting discussion of the doctrine's appli-
cation to long-arm jurisdiction, see Morley, Forum Non Conveniens: Restraining
Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 24 (1973).
41. 54 Ill. 2d 511, 301 N.E.2d 729 (1973).
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granted. The Illinois Supreme Court laid down three factors to
be used by the trial courts in determining whether to grant a forum
non conveniens motion: (1) The relative capacity of the two jur-
isdictions to provide a fair trial; (2) the relative inconvenience to
the witnesses and parties; and (3) the burden upon the taxpayers
and residents of the jurisdiction to which the cause of action is
transported. In applying these standards to the case, a majority of
the Illinois Supreme Court observed that since Iowa law was to be
applied and since an Iowa jury could more conveniently view the
scene of the occurrence, Iowa was the more convenient forum. In
addition, the court noted that the average delay in trial for the
14th Judicial Circuit, which includes Rock Island County, was
eighteen and one-half months so that the promptness inherent in a
fair trial would be diminished were the case tried in Illinois. Jus-
tice Goldenhersh in dissent felt that these grounds were insufficient
to find an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge.
The conclusion of the Illinois Supreme Court was reinforced by
what the majority considered the "unusual circumstances"4 2 of the
case. These circumstances were that the case had been ready for
trial in federal court in Iowa more than a year and a half before
the case was tried in Illinois but that the plaintiff nonetheless dis-
missed the Iowa suit and refiled in Illinois because the plaintiff
was dissatisfied with the pretrial rulings of the Iowa judge on the
admissibility of certain evidence at trial. The Illinois Supreme
Court stated:
What we have, then, is in practical result an appeal to the Illinois courts
from the rulings of the Iowa judge. This is unseemly business, and in our
opinion the denial of the motion to dismiss, which was accompanied by a
waiver Of the statute of limitations, was an abuse of discretion. 43
The appellate court was unimpressed by the addition of two individ-
ual Illinois defendants some four months after the action had al-
ready been refiled in Illinois and more than a year and a half
after the plaintiff had first sued in Iowa. A majority of the Illi-
nois Supreme Court believed that the two individual defendants were
not joined either with probable cause or in good faith.
The unusual circumstances of the Adkins decision should be




kept in mind when assessing the scope of'-this decision. Since the
Illinois Supreme Court did not compare trial delays in Illinois with
comparable statistic for trial delays in Iowa, the eighteen and one-half
months trial delay in Rock Island County loses meaning. The fact
that Iowa law is to be applied and that the scene of the occurrence is
in Iowa are factors of some importance but probably insufficient in
themselves to brand the action of the trial judge as an abuse of discre-
tion. Rather, one is left with the definite impression that the al-
leged attempt of the plaintiff to circumvent adverse pretrial rulings
of the Iowa judge was the crucial factor for the Illinois Supreme
Court. If Illinois were to allow a plaintiff -to evade adverse rulings
by a federal judge using the law of a sister state, the efficacy and
desirability of pretrial rulings as a means of simplifying issues at
trial would be severely undercut. It may even be that the judges
would become reluctant to rule on issues at the pretrial stage for
fear that the plaintiff, upon sustaining an adverse ruling, would
simply dismiss the case and refile in a sister state that also had juris-
diction.
Finally, in Crawley v. Bauchens"4 a husband and wife were di-
vorced in Illinois, and the wife was awarded custody of Eric, the child
of the marriage. The former wife then married a career army of-
ficer in the Canal Zone. The army officer, according to the court,
was not a resident of Illinois but was a resident of either Florida,
the Canal Zone, or both. The career army officer, who held the
rank of major, filed a petition in the United States District Court
for the Canal Zone to adopt Eric. The former wife of Eric's nat-
ural father, and by then, the current wife of the major,' consented
to the petition. Notice of the pending adoption was served on the
natural father who then filed his own petition in Illinois to enjoin
Eric's mother from proceeding with the adoption in the Canal Zone
and to require that she withdraw her consent to the adoption. The
Illinois trial court 'granted this aspect of the petitition filed by the
natural father.
The appellate court in Illinois first decided that Illinois had jur-
isdiction over Eric and his mother even though the general rules are
that the domicile of the wife would be that of her new husband and
44. 13 III. App. 3d 791, 300 N.E.2d 603 (5th Dist. 1973).
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that the domicile of a minor child of divorced parents is that of the
parent to whom custody has been granted. However, the court in-
voked the principle of continuing jurisdiction 45 to hold that since
Illinois had granted the divorce to Eric's parents, Illinois still re-
tained jurisdiction over the incidents of the divorce. Having deter-
mined that Illinois had jurisdiction, the appellate court, nonetheless,
reversed the decision of the trial court on the ground that even
though the federal court in the Canal Zone was not an article III
court, the supremacy clause of the Constitution seemed to require that
the right to file for adoption in the Canal Zone was a right created by
Congress and thus entitled to superior recognition. The court in
dictum did indicate that even if the status of the federal court were
no different than that of a sister state court, prior Illinois precedent
would require that "since the Canal Zone Court has jurisdiction of
the subject matter and all the interested parties, action there
should not be restrained."4" The dissenting opinion held that there
was a sufficiently important interest in protecting the rights of the
natural father so as to offset any policy against enjoining action in
another jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
There is the possibility that -the courts of Illlinois will be as crea-
tive in refashioning the principles of conflicts law as they were in
the area of products liability. The cautious introduction of the rule
of validation into Illinois jurisprudence by the Cook Associates
case is a hopeful sign that an antiquated conflicts rule for contracts
cases will be replaced by a validation principle that gives maximum
play to the intention of the parties to make enforceable contracts.
This principle of validation in contracts cases is even more ad-
vanced than the Restatement (Second) view because of its greater
emphasis on fulfilling the justified expectation of the parties that
they entered into an agreement that was legally binding. Despite
the brief backsliding of the Cardin, Amundson, and Naramore
cases, the "most significant relationship" principle is still firmly es-
45. "If a state obtains judicial jurisdiction over a party to an action, the jurisdic-
tion continues throughout all subsequent proceedings which arise out of the original
cause of action." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 26.
46. 13 Ill. App. 3d at 798-99, 300 N.E.2d at 609.
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tablished for tort cases. As the pre-Ingersoll cases are disposed of,
there will be no way to evade the full impact of the Ingersoll deci-
sion. The only danger would be if the Ingersoll decision were
simply used as a rationalizing device so that plaintiffs could always
prevail under the more favorable law. Such an approach would
destroy any possibility of developing a defensible body of conflicts
principles in the tort area because the expectations of the parties
simply do not play the same role in tort law that they do in con-
tracts cases. It is meaningless to imply that in tort cases the parties
intend the plaintiff to recover in the same way that parties intend
to make a binding argeement in the contract area. Finally, the
same concern should be shown for sister state sensitivity in the area
of judgments that has been shown this last term in the Adkins case
where the issue was only one of forum non conveniens.
